

Releasable

# OPERATION



DEPT. OF JUSTICE

# 63

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Declassified under the provisions of (The  
Freedom of Information Act) 5U.S.C.552  
(b) (1)

RECOMMENDED NMCC CONFERENCE ROOM ACCESS LIST

SECDEF	DDOs
DEPSECDEF	Director, DIA and Deputies for Production
ASD - Public Affairs	Director, NSA
Chairman, JCS and Joint Chiefs	BGen Allen, USAF
Director, Joint Staff	BGen Baldwin, USA
Operations Deputies	RAdm Engen, USN
LTG Knowles	BGen Blackburn, USA
J-3	Mr. Zaslow, NSA Rep
Deputy J-3	Captain Train, USN

OPERATIONS PERSONNEL

(Will be on a shift bases)

Col Mayer, USA, Chief Special Ops Div, J-3	DIA Representatives
Col Gibson, Dep SACSA	Capt J. S. Harris, USN
Col Norman, Opns Officer	Cdr John Bruce, USN
Col Rice, NMCC Opns Officer	Capt N. J. Nash, USAF
LTC Little, Opns Officer	Capt J. E. Kennedy
LTC Pattee, Opns Officer	Mr. R. C. Guemther
LTC Hatch, Opns Officer	Mr. J. T. Berbrich
	SSgt S. E. Graves, USA
	Draftsmen
	Sp Jordan
	Draftsman Downing
	Mrs. F. L. Earley, Secretary

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US Forces arrive in this objective area by air, according to a precisely timed movement from Thailand over Laos and into NVN from the west. After the proper NCS approvals and weather clearance, and at approximately 4 hours prior to the actual assault landing, the first aircraft, a specially configured C-130 designed for essential enroute and pinpoint terminal navigation, departs Takhli for Nakhon Phanom. At this location the C-130 is joined by 4 A-1 aircraft and both elements proceed to a H/C air refueling point north of the Plaine de Jarres. Shortly thereafter, a second similar type C-130 launches from Takhli, overflies Udorn, and proceeds to this same refueling point (Fig 4). The assault helicopters, 1 - HH-3 and 5-HH-53s depart Udorn in time to rendezvous with their refueling aircraft, and complete refueling by H-1:00.

H-1:00 is the time that these forces combine and form 2 groups, with the lead C-130 and the H/Cs comprising the first group followed in 10 minutes by the other C-130 with 4 A-1s.

These two groups then continue in trail, crossing high points on the route in Laos at 2000 feet above ground level, and descending to 1000 feet as they move into North Vietnam about 38 minutes prior to TOT. The NVN NW radar network

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should not detect the penetration until it enters the Red River Valley at approximately 12 minutes prior to TOT and, from that point on, the formation is subject to continuous tracking by enemy radar (Fig 5).

Just prior to the appearance of the force from the west, diversionary penetrations by Navy air, consisting of two staggered thrusts toward the coast by squadron-sized forces beginning at H-20 minutes, are expected to trigger a conventional air attack response by the North Vietnamese. The real effort will then be competing for resources and attention (Fig 6).

Additionally, 8 F-4s are available for MIG CAP and cycle into the objective area in flights of 2 to perform orbits both NE and SE of Hanoi. They depart Udorn in time to be on station by H-hour under the control of COLLEGE EYE (EC-121s) orbiting over the Gulf of Tonkin providing enemy and friendly air order of battle information to the command center located in the TACC-NS at Da Nang. An RC-135  aircraft also orbits in the Gulf and functions as the alternate mission control with the airborne mission coordinator aboard. The Mission Commander, General Manor, is at the tactical air control center located at MONKEY MOUNTAIN near Danang and is able to monitor developments as they unfold and direct the forces accordingly (Fig 7).

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The formation approaches the first IP at approximately 500 feet. There are excellent navigation features along the approach route and both the first IP and the final IP are distinctive lakes, easily discernible by airborne equipment. Assault tactics commence one-half mile from the target on signal from the lead C-130. The helicopters will slow up and descend while the C-130 jumps up to 1500 feet and releases flares directly over the prison. The HH-3 and three assault HH-53s should be within thirty seconds of landing at H-hour when the flares ignite (Fig 8).

After dropping flares over the prison, this first C-130 makes a right turn and drops fire fight simulators southeast of Son Tay city to split and divert attention of enemy forces possibly billeted in the town. The C-130 then continues to the southwest and drops two firebombs, marker flares, and fire fight simulators in the vicinity of an ammunition storage area four kilometers southwest of the target. The firebombs serve the dual purpose of creating a diversion and providing a highly visible anchor point for two A-1s to come forward and orbit, beginning at H+30 seconds. This anchor is located at the most probable source of any ground threat to the prison operations.

The C-130 then proceeds west to a point where it can function as a UHF/DF aid for A-1s and H/Cs when they depart the target. The HH-53s, after disembarking their troops

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at the prison, move to relatively isolated areas four kilometers to the northwest where they will land and wait until called back by the Ground Commander (20 - 30 minutes).

The reserve, with one C-130, the remaining 1 A-1s, and 2 empty HH-53s not used in the assault turn right, out of the line of flight, 3 minutes away from the target and form a helicopter and A-1 pattern north of Ba Vi Mountain with the C-130 holding west of the Black River (Fig 9).

Having left the assault helicopters about 30 seconds out from the target, we will return to the ground operation that these troop carrying aircraft will initiate. The ground attack force consists of 56 Army Special Forces personnel commanded by Colonel Arthur D. Simons. This ground force is organized into three groups; command, assault, and support. The essentials of this operation are surprise, speed, and simplicity.

The attack starts with a heliborne assault on Son Tay PW camp at H-30 seconds with three helicopters making flare-lighted west-southwest firing approaches. The guard towers communication center, and guard quarters area are neutralized. H-hour puts the lead helicopter, the HH-3, on the ground in the courtyard of the PW compound. The assault group aboard this helicopter, consisting of three

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action elements, secures the inside of the compound and the demolitionist blows the wall near the southwest corner. This force then proceeds to designated cellblocks to release and guide PWs to a control point (Fig 10). Immediately after the assault group lands inside, helos #1 and #2 with the command and support groups, land outside to the south of the compound in cultivated rice fields.

The support group sweeps through the area housing communication facilities and enemy support troops, including compound guards. The bridge north of the objective is secured, the communication cable on the bridge cut, and the bridge span closest to the objective blown. Buildings immediately across the road are swept. The command group establishes blocking positions on the road south, the canal southwest, and the southwest corner of the compound wall from which the PWs will be exited.

The final phase finds organized and closely controlled aircraft loads being moved to the pickup point, one load at a time, for final count, loading, and takeoff. Ground forces are phased out of the area with PW loads, and security elements are rolled back to the pickup point. These security elements, the last PWs along with the ground force commander, depart the objective area on the last aircraft. All aircraft depart the target area individually, with time and route



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separation for safety, bound for Udorn where provisions have been made for reception and treatment. The HH-3 will be left in the compound and destroyed with a timed explosive charge.

The support element has four thirty-pound prepared satchel charges for dropping the bridge span at the south end and adhesive charges for cutting the cable.

A-1 aircraft provide air cover and early warning to the ground force and are responsive to enemy threats with 20 MM cannon fire, rockets, and bombs.

In the event that "hard" confinement cells are encountered, a capability exists of cutting through 3/8 inch steel plate with back-packed oxy-acetylene gear, removing locks with compound bolt cutters, and cutting through hardwood stocks with chain saws. Great trouble along this line is not anticipated.

The ground commander is positive that the operation will succeed. He has personally selected every man on this mission - they are all volunteers, dedicated, and free from any discernible defect. The training was thorough, definitive, and intense.

The aircrews are among the best available. They were also individually selected and all aircraft commanders are volunteers. The forward looking infrared navigation systems recently installed in the two C-130 lead aircraft have performed very well, [as has a VHF jamming device placed on] <sup>the</sup>

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[three A-1 aircraft just prior to the operation] Dress rehearsals, to include complete full profile missions, have been conducted with the special munitions and electronic equipment selected, to achieve a peak in forces.

In all planning and training, security has been uppermost of all priorities. We have in the group, highly qualified security personnel and have incorporated their ideas into every facet of operational planning and deception. A communications monitoring unit was established at the Eglin AFB pre-deployment training site and CIA/DIA also assisted in the security endeavor. Project personnel have been thoroughly briefed on the security requirements and charged with the responsibility for compliance.


In all cases, the location and TOT of our operation have been closely held. D-day, and H-hour, plus required code word meanings, were passed verbally from designated members of the Joint Task Group to required element commanders only. Formatted messages are being used whenever possible in our communications for: execution approval, delays, or cancellation. Secure communications have been established with General Manor in Da Nang, Admiral McCain and selected personnel in the NMCC to provide as much of the real-time progress of the operation as the deliberately limited traffic will permit.

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
If resources in support of this operation reveal that the enemy may have determined our objective, the operation will be cancelled.

EVENT	H-HOUR COUNT	NORTH VN/THAILAND		EASTERN STANDARD	
		PLAN	REAL	PLAN	REAL
NCA APPROVAL					
1st WEATHER "60"	H-9:00	1718		0518	
2nd WEATHER "60"	H-5:00	2118		0918	
1st C-130(STRIKE) DEP TAKHLI	H-4:10	2208		1008	
2nd C-130 (ASSAULT) DEP TAKHLI	H-3:20	2258		1058	
HELOS (ASSAULT) DEP UDORN	H-3:00	2318		1118	
A-1s (STRIKE) DEP NKP	H-2:40	2338		1138	
REFUELING COMPLETE	H-1:00	0118		1318	
CROSS LAOS-HVN BORDER	H-0:38	0140		1340	
BEGIN NAVY COASTAL DIVERSION (45 MIN)	H-0:20	0158		1358	
I.P. ENROUTE TO TARGET	H-0:06.5	0211.5		1411.5	
ASSAULT LANDING	H-0	0218		1418	
EXTRACTION & WITHDRAWAL FROM TARGET	H+0:20 to H+0:30	0238 to 0248		1438 to 1448	
RECOVER AT UDORN					



TONKIN  
FIG. 1

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


*[Handwritten signature]*



FIG 2

# SON IAY PW CAMP


21 08 36N 105 30 01E



**LEGEND**





-  PW CELLS
-  PROBABLY ENEMY OCCUPIED

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**LEGEND**

-  PW CELLS
-  PROBABLY ENEMY OCCUPIED
-  ADMIN & SUPPORT BLDGS.
-  LAIRINE

75 0 75 50 75 100 125 150 175 200  
 ||||| | | | | | | | |  
 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

FIG. 1  
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


FIG 4

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Scale 1:2,000,000






FIG 5

DEVELOPMENT

Scale 1:2,000,000



NORTH VIETNAM DIVERSION H-20 TO H-65



H-20 4:10  
H-20 3:20

FIG 6

# FOPCES

## PRIMARY MISSION

1 - C-130E [ENROUTE NAVIGATION] -

12 USAF

3 - HH-53 [ASSAULT] -

13 USAF, 42 SPEC. FORCES

1 - H-3 [COMPOUND ASSAULT] -

3 USAF, 14 SPEC. FORCES

2 - A-1 [GROUND SUPPORT] -

4 USAF

## RESERVE

1 - C-130E

2 - HH-53

2 - A-1

## SUPPORT

1 - RC-135 [COMBAT APPLE]

2 - EC-121 [COLLEGE EYE]

2 - HC-130 [HELICOPTER TANKER]

8 - F-4 [MIG CAP]

## NAVY DIVERSION

10 - F-4/F-8

4 - RA-5

8 - A-4/A-7

8 - A-6

14 - VARIOUS SUPPORT

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# TARGET AREA TACTICS

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F-4  
MIG  
CAP

NE OF HANOI

HANOI

20 NM

F-4  
MIG  
CAP

SE OF HANOI







FIG. 2

SUN TAY PW CAMP


21 08 36N 105 30 01E



LEGEND

-  PW CELLS
-  PROBABLY ENEMY OCCUPIED

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LEGEND	
	PW CELLS
	PROBABLY ENEMY OCCUPIED
	ADMIN & SUPPORT BLDGS.
	LATRINE

FIG 1

# TARGET AREA TACTICS

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F-4  
MIG  
CAP  
NE OF H.

HANG  
20 N

F-4  
MIG  
CAP  
SE OF HA




FIG 9



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ALTERNATE PLANS

Blue Plan

Organization and Forces: Same as basic plan minus Assault Group, due to aircraft loss or abort prior to reaching target area.

Scope of Operations: Command Group breaches wall, clears compound and releases PWs; Support Group assumes responsibility for area outside compound to include bridge and road/canal junction. Alternate plan conducted with a tempo commensurate with reduction in Ground Force party.

Red Plan

Organization and Forces: Same as basic plan minus Command Group due to aircraft loss or abort prior to reaching target area.

Scope of Operations: Assault Group lands within compound, neutralizes guard towers, main gate and buildings, releases and guides PWs; Support Group secures area north, east and south of compound, destroys bridges and communications cable, provides control point for evacuation of PWs. Support Group aircraft mini-gun fires increased. Alternate plan conducted with a tempo commensurate with reduction in Ground Force party.

Green Plan

Organization and Force: Same as basic plan minus Support Group due to aircraft loss or abort prior to reaching target area.

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Scope of Operation: Assault Group lands within compound, neutralizes Guard Towers, main gate and buildings within compound, releases PWs. Command Group lands in field near Building 7B, secures area north, east and south of compound; establishes control point for evacuation of PWs. Alternate plan conducted with a tempo commensurate with reduction in Ground Force party.

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COMMAND POSTS

Headquarters

Location

National Military Command Center (NMCC)	Pentagon
CINCPAC	Camp Smith, Hawaii
CINCPACFLT	Kunia, Hawaii
COM 7th FLEET	Western Pacific
COMTF 77	Yankee Station
CINCPACAF	Hickam AFB, Hawaii
COM 7 AF	Tan Son Nhut, RVN
DEPCOM 7/13AF	Udorn, RTAFB, Thailand
COMJCTG Overseas Headquarters and Staging Base	Takhli, RTAFB, Thailand
Employment Command Post- Tactical Air Control Center North Sector	Son Tra, RVN (Monkey Mountain)
Ground Force, HH-53, H-3, F-4, HC-130 Element Command Posts	Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
C-130 Element Command Post	Takhli RTAFB, Thailand
A-1 Element Command Post	Nakhon Phanom, RTAFB, Thailand
RC-135 Element Command Post	Kadena AFB, Okinawa
KC-135 Element Command Post	Utapao RTAFB, Thailand
EC-121 Element Command Post	Korat RTAFB, Thailand/ Danang AFB, RVN
Navy Diversionary Aircraft Command Post	Yankee Station
Recovery Base	Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
Redeployment Base	Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

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VHF FM Enroute and Ground Command Net. Provides:

- Enroute communications for the Primary and Reserve Element aircraft.
- Close air support direction and coordination.

UHF Enroute and Air/Ground Net. Provides:


- Enroute communications (via relay as required) between COMJCTG, the Assault and Strike aircraft, and the Airborne Mission Coordinator.
- Communications (via relay as required) between the Ground Force Commander and COMJCTG.
- SAR communications as required.

Ground Operations Communications

- During ground operations, the ground force commander, as the overall "on scene" commander will establish and control communications (FM and UHF) to subordinate ground elements, air strike elements, (A-1s), and air assault elements (HH-53s).
- The Airborne Relay Link (A-1E - RC-135) is the primary communications between COMJCTG and the ground forces commander during ground operations, accordingly, the air ground net (UHF) is critical both for relay of COMJCTG command communications and the primary "on scene" radio net for the ground commander's control of subordinate air elements in the target area.

Ground Force Commander

- Activates net control station in ground force command radio net (FM) as the primary communications with subordinate ground force group leaders and for alternate communications with subordinate air strike (A-1) and air assault (HH-53) elements.
- Activate net control station in air/ground radio net (UHF) at H+1 minute as primary communications with subordinate air strike and air assault elements and relay of critical reports to COMJCTG.

- 
- Direct activation of forward air guide net (FM) and enter as alternate net control station as required.
  - Be prepared to employ backup audio and visual communications for command and control of major subordinate groups elements.

#### Search and Rescue Operations

- Coordinated by Air Force HC-130 (Crown) which will guard ground command net (FM) and air ground net (UHF) as well as SAR guard frequencies required to coordinate SAR operations.
- All ground force personnel will be provided an AN/PRC-90 radio for emergency search and rescue operations. In the event that all other communications means fail during ground operations, the AN/PRC-90 may be used by ground force group/element leaders for communications with the ground force commander on PRC-90 alternate guard frequency.

[REDACTED]

OPERATION COVER STORIES

1. Successful - No cover required. News release will emphasize exact nature of operation.
2. Successful with Loss of Aircraft - Results justified the risk.
3. Disclosure prior to launch - Highly classified operation, no details.
4. Aborted - Disclosed after launch and aborted - SAR mission, downed airman.
5. Unsuccessful before reaching target - SAR mission, downed airman.
6. No PWs in camp or unsuccessful at target - intransigence of NVN made attempt necessary, results worth risk.

[REDACTED]

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DECISION POINTS - 21 NOVEMBER

<u>Time (EST)</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Authority</u>
0518	First Weather "Go/No-Go"	COMJCTG
0918	Final Weather "Go/No-Go"	COMJCTG
Before 1008	Abort operation prior to launch	CJCS/COMJCTG
Up To 1208	Delay launch for weather	COMJCTG
1008-1418	Abort operation en route	CJCS/COMJCTG
1418-1448	Operational decisions at objective	COMJCTG/CO Gnd Force
Any Time	Cancel operation (pre-arranged Code Word)	NCA/CJCS

NOTE: 24 hour weather delay may be directed by COMJCTG for a D-day of 23 Nov and 24 Nov with no change in H-hour. A delay for a D-day of 25 or 26 Nov will require a new H-hour of one hour later. A new D-day of 27 Nov or after will revert to original H-hour.

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EXPECTED REPORTS..

<u>Report</u>	<u>Responsible HQ</u>
* NCA approval	JCS
* Acknowledge receipt of NCA approval	JCTG
First weather "Go/No-Go" (H-9:00)	JCTG
Final weather "Go/No-Go" (H-5:00)	JCTG
* Launch (H-4:10)	JCTG
Refueling complete (H-1:00)	JCTG
Cross Laos - NVN Border (H-0:38)	JCTG
Cross I.P. (H-0:06 1/2)	JCTG
TOT (H-Hour)	JCTG
Cross NVN-Laos Border	JCTG
Return refueling complete	JCTG
* Recover at Udorn (H+3:30)	JCTG
PWs undergoing medical clearance procedures. Names forwarded (H+5:00)	JCTG
PWs depart Udorn by C-141 for CONUS (H+6:00)	JCTG

NOTE: Times in parenthesis are approximate for action to occur. Reports to NMCC will be received at a later time.

\* Required.

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NMCC OPERATIONS DUTY

20 Nov 70 - 21 Nov 70

Team One

(0930 Hrs, 20 Nov 70 - 2000 Hrs, 20 Nov 70)

Col E. E. Mayer, USA, Chief Special Ops Division,  
J-3

Col W. C. Norman, USA, Ops Officer, Special Ops  
Division, J-3

Col F. C. Rice, USAF, Ops Officer, NMCC

Team Two

(2000 Hrs, 20 Nov 70 - 0800 Hrs, 21 Nov 70)

Col B. P. Gibson, USAF, Dep SACSA, J-3

Lt Col D. C. Hatch, USAF, Ops Officer, Special  
Ops Division, J-3

Lt Col J. R. Pattee, USAF, Ops Officer, Special  
Ops Division, J-3

Lt Col N. R. Little, USAF, Ops Officer, Special  
Ops Division, J-3

NOTE: Appropriate DIA representation will be present.

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SCHEDULE OF BRIEFINGS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
19 Nov	1700	Col Mayer briefs DDOs in Office of SACSA.
19 Nov	1500	SACSA briefs Mr. Henkin in Office of SACSA
20 Nov	on call	SACSA conference with BGen Allen, USAF, BGen Baldwin, USA, RAdm Christiansen, USN and Colonel Disilvio in Senior Authorities Room.
20 Nov	1315	SACSA briefs selected participants in NMCC Conference Room

Note: Other briefings will be conducted as required during progress of operation.

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IT IS A PLEASURE FOR ME TO SPEAK TO YOU TODAY ABOUT THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RESCUE OPERATION CONDUCTED ON THE NIGHT OF 20-21 NOVEMBER 1971. DUE TO THE TIME LIMITATIONS, I WILL COVER ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PLANNING, TRAINING, AND EXECUTION OF THE MISSION.

ONE YEAR AGO TODAY A SMALL GROUP OF TEN MILITARY PERSONNEL, WORKING UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE OJCS, WERE BUSILY ENGAGED IN STUDYING THE FEASIBILITY OF AN EFFORT TO RESCUE US POW'S BEING HELD IN NORTH VIETNAM. THIS STUDY WAS INITIATED BECAUSE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE OJCS BY USAF INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL INDICATING THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRISONER OF WAR RESCUE ATTEMPT SHOULD BE EXPLORED. THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY VALIDATED THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CONCEPT AND RECOMMENDED THE FORMATION OF A JOINT CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP TO DEVELOP A DETAILED PLAN AND TO SELECT AND TRAIN A JOINT FORCE. THE JCS APPROVED THIS RECOMMENDATION AND ON 8 AUGUST I WAS APPOINTED THE COMMANDER OF THE TASK GROUP AND COLONEL ARTHUR D. SIMONS, US ARMY, WAS APPOINTED MY DEPUTY. THE JOINT PLANNING STAFF WAS IMMEDIATELY ORGANIZED, EXPANDING THE ORIGINAL GROUP TO ABOUT 25 PERSONNEL, COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL SERVICES. THIS GROUP WORKED IN A LIMITED ACCESS AREA IN THE OJCS AND WE CONSIDERED OTHER POW LOCATIONS IN ADDITION TO SON TAY. AFTER GATHERING ALL OF THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON WE DECIDED WE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION ON THESE CAMPS TO MOUNT A RECOVERY EFFORT SO WE CONCENTRATED ALL OF OUR PLANNING ON SON TAY.

TRAINING WAS TO BE CONDUCTED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE DETAILED PLANNING. THIS WORKED OUT VERY WELL SINCE IT ALLOWED US TO MODIFY AND REFINE OUR PLAN BASED ON ACTUAL OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE.

I WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE JCS TO REPORT BACK WHETHER OR NOT WE CONSIDERED SUCH A MISSION TO BE FEASIBLE AND IF SO, WHEN THE FORCE WOULD BE TRAINED AND READY FOR EMPLOYMENT.

EGLIN AFB, FLORIDA WAS SELECTED AS THE TRAINING SITE BECAUSE OF ITS VAST AREA AND THE FACT THAT OTHER JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES WERE CONDUCTED THERE AT FREQUENT INTERVALS WE FELT WE COULD CONDUCT THE TRAINING WITHOUT CREATING ANY SPECULATIONS AS TO WHAT THE ACTUAL MISSION WAS. WE EMPLOYED COVER STORIES TO INDICATE WE WERE TRAINING A FORCE TO RECOVER BELEAGUED US NATIONALS, GIVING THE IDEA THAT PERHAPS WE WERE GOING TO TRY TO RECOVER KIDNAPPED DIPLOMATS. THE CODE WORD FOR THE PROJECT WAS IVORY COAST WHICH AUTOMATICALLY LEADS ONE TO THINK OF AFRICA.

WE WANTED THE TASK GROUP TO BE COMPOSED OF 100 PERCENT VOLUNTEERS. COLONEL SIMONS WENT TO FORT BRAGG, N. C., THE HOME OF THE US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES, TO SELECT THE PERSONNEL FOR THE ARMY FORCES. WE NEEDED APPROXIMATELY 100 ARMY PERSONNEL. ALTHOUGH WE COULD NOT TELL THEM WHAT THE MISSION WAS, EXCEPT THEY WERE VOLUNTEERING FOR AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT MISSION AND ONE THAT HAD CONSIDERABLE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH IT, FIVE HUNDRED PERSONNEL VOLUNTEERED FOR THE ASSIGNMENT. EACH VOLUNTEER WAS INTERVIEWED BY COLONEL SIMONS AND A MEDICAL OFFICER BEFORE FINAL SELECTION OF THE 100 PERSONNEL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MISSION.

I SELECTED THE US AIR FORCE PERSONNEL BASED ON THEIR EXPERIENCE. WE FELT WE HAD THE VERY BEST AIRCREWS AVAILABLE FOR THIS OPERATION. THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WERE ALL COMBAT EXPERIENCED PEOPLE AND HAD SERVED PREVIOUS TOURS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA EXCEPT FOUR OF THE ARMY FORCE WHO WERE SELECTED BECAUSE OF CERTAIN SPECIALTIES WE NEEDED.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY WAS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE AND THIS ACTION WAS STRESSED THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION SINCE ANY BREACH OF SECURITY WOULD CERTAINLY CAUSE CANCELLATION OF THE MISSION. THE TASK GROUP WAS AUGMENTED BY SECURITY EXPERTS FROM THE USAF OSI, THE USAF SECURITY SERVICE AND THE US ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

THROUGHOUT THE PLANNING AND TRAINING CYCLES WE CONCENTRATED ON THE STUDY OF THE ENEMY DEFENSES AND CAMP ACTIVITY. CLOSE COORDINATION WAS EFFECTED WITH ALL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. WE RECEIVED EXCELLENT PHOTOGRAPHY, PHOTO INTERPRETATION AND A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON THE PRISONERS OF WAR FROM THE DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND USAF INTELLIGENCE. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WORKED CLOSELY WITH US AND THEY CONSTRUCTED A SCALE MODEL OF THE POW CAMP WHICH WAS EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN OUR PLANNING AND TRAINING. A FULL SCALE MODEL OF THE CAMP WAS CONSTRUCTED AT EGLIN AND TO GIVE YOU A GOOD APPRECIATION FOR OUR CONCERN FOR SECURITY THE CAMP WAS USED AT NIGHT FOR OUR TRAINING AND DISASSEMBLED PRIOR TO DAYLIGHT IN ORDER TO AVOID DETECTION BY.

THE TRAINING WAS INTENSE AND VERY THOROUGH. THE GROUND TACTICS WERE REHEARSED A TOTAL OF 170 TIMES AGAINST THE MODEL OF THE SON TAY CAMP. JOINT TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED NIGHTLY, INCLUDING WEEKENDS AND HOLIDAYS. THE JOINT ASPECTS OF THE MISSION WERE STRESSED THROUGHOUT THIS TRAINING AND JOINT TRAINING MEETINGS WERE HELD DAILY PRIOR TO MISSION BRIEFINGS. NO INTER-SERVICE PROBLEMS DEVELOPED AT ALL.

EVEN THOUGH WE DECIDED TO USE OFF-THE-SHELF EQUIPMENT AND PROVEN TECHNIQUES TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WE DID COME UP WITH SOME EXCELLENT INNOVATIONS FOR LOW LEVEL NAVIGATION, COMMUNICATIONS, FIRE FIGHT SIMULATORS, ORDNANCE AND NIGHT OPTICS. AS AN EXAMPLE, WE PROCURED A NIGHT OPTICS SIGHT ON THE COMMERCIAL MARKET. THIS SIMPLE SIGHT, NORMALLY USED BY HUNTERS, INCREASED THE NIGHT FIRING ACCURACY FROM THE NORMAL 35 PERCENT TO ABOUT 95 PERCENT.

IN THE MEDICAL AREA, OUR MEDICAL STAFF OFFICER MADE A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE POW'S. HE WENT BACK TO WW II AND THE KOREAN WAR TO STUDY THE CONDITIONS WE HAD FOUND AMONG OUR POWS. HE DETERMINED WHAT CONDITION WE MIGHT FIND THESE PEOPLE IN AND WHAT KIND OF FOOD, MEDICINES, AND CLOTHING WOULD BE REQUIRED BY THE POWS.

ON 16 SEPTEMBER I BRIEFED THE JCS ON THE TECHNICAL CONCEPT AND REPORTED THAT THE PLAN WAS FEASIBLE AND THE FORCE WOULD BE TRAINED AND READY FOR EMPLOYMENT BY 8 OCTOBER. WE RECOMMENDED THE MISSION BE CONDUCTED ON 21 OCTOBER. WE BRIEFED THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE DIRECTOR, CIA, ON 24 SEPTEMBER.

THE SECRETARY DEFERRED HIS APPROVAL PENDING WORD FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY AND AUTHORIZED US TO BRIEF ADMIRAL MCCAIN, CINCPAC, WHO WAS TO BE IN WASHINGTON ON 25 SEPTEMBER. THE PLAN WAS ENTHUSIASTICALLY RECEIVED BUT IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE OPERATION SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL NOVEMBER, OUR ALTERNATE DATE.

ONE REASON I WANTED TO GO IN OCTOBER WAS BECAUSE I WAS VERY MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY. HOWEVER, THE DELAY ALLOWED US TIME FOR FURTHER TRAINING AND COORDINATION.

ON 27 OCTOBER THE CHAIRMAN, JCS, APPROVED THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN IN-THEATER COORDINATING STAFF ON 1 NOVEMBER AND THE TASK GROUP ON 10 NOVEMBER. THE FINAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT THE MISSION WAS GIVEN TO ME ON 18 NOVEMBER, AFTER I ARRIVED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

THERE WAS A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF COORDINATION TO BE ACCOMPLISHED ONCE WE ARRIVED IN-THEATER. AIRCRAFT AND CREWS HAD TO BE MOVED FROM THEIR NORMAL OPERATING BASE TO THE LAUNCH BASE. ALL CREWS HAD TO BE BRIEFED SINCE WE WERE USING SOME ADDITIONAL IN-THEATER FORCES THAT HAD NOT BEEN USED DURING THE TRAINING PERIOD. ALL ELEMENTS OF THE JOINT TASK GROUP WERE IN PLACE AND IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS TO PERFORM THEIR INDIVIDUAL MISSIONS. IT WAS THE US AIR FORCE'S JOB TO TRANSPORT THE US ARMY RAIDING FORCE INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA, TO PROTECT THIS FORCE WHILE THEY PERFORMED THEIR MISSION AND TO AIRLIFT THIS FORCE, PLUS POSSIBLY UP TO ONE HUNDRED US PRISONERS OF WAR, FROM THE CAMP AND RETURN THEM TO THE STAGING BASE. IN THE MEANTIME, THE US NAVY WOULD BE CARRYING OUT THEIR ASSIGNED DIVERSIONARY MISSIONS TO CONFUSE THE ENEMIES DEFENSES AND TO DRAW THEIR ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE ACTUAL OBJECTIVE AREA. EVERYONE WAS SET TO GO ON THE NIGHT OF 21 NOVEMBER.

WE WERE ADVISED ON 18 NOVEMBER THAT TYPHOON PATSY WAS OVER THE PHILIPPINES AND MOVING WEST WITH A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF WEATHER ASSOCIATED WITH IT. ALSO, A FRONT WAS MOVING DOWN FROM CHINA AND THE TWO WERE FORECASTED TO CONVERGE OVER HANOI ON THE NIGHT OF 21 NOVEMBER, OUR PRIMARY DATE. THE WEATHER EXPERTS TOLD ME THAT THE ONLY THING THAT COULD SAVE THE DAY WOULD BE FOR A RIDGE TO

FORM AS IT SOMETIMES DOES OVER HANOI AND IF THIS HAPPENED IT WOULD MOVE THE CLOUDS OUT OF THE HANOI AREA BUT ONLY FOR A FEW HOURS. I THEN MADE THE TOUGHEST DECISION OF THE ENTIRE OPERATION. I DECIDED TO GO ON THE MISSION ONE DAY EARLY.

JUST A FEW HOURS BEFORE LAUNCH TIME THE GROUP WAS ASSEMBLED AND FOR THE FIRST TIME THE MEN WERE TOLD OF THE ACTUAL MISSION. THEY WERE SO THRILLED AND ELATED THEY STOOD UP AND APPLAUDED. THEY WERE IN HIGH SPIRITS, UP FOR THE MISSION AND READY TO GO. I FELT I HAD THE BEST TRAINED AND BEST SUPPORTED FORCE EVER ASSEMBLED FOR A SPECIAL OPERATION. I WAS CONFIDENT OF OUR CAPABILITY TO DO THE JOB.

ALL FACETS OF THE OPERATION WENT PRECISELY AS PLANNED. THE WEATHER ENROUTE AND OVER THE OBJECTIVE AREA WAS EXCELLENT. THE TRICKY REFUELLING OPERATIONS AT NIGHT WERE WITHOUT INCIDENT. OUR COMMUNICATIONS WORKED WELL AND THE TIMING WAS NEAR PERFECT FOR THE RAIDING FORCE AS WELL AS ALL THE SUPPORT ELEMENTS. THERE WERE NO SURPRISES ON ENEMY REACTION. OUR MISSILE AND A MIG SUPPRESSION WAS EFFECTIVE. THE NAVY DIVERSION EFFORT UTTERLY CONFUSED THE ENEMIES DEFENSES AND OUR A-1s PROVIDED EXCELLENT COVER FOR THE C-130s AND THE HELICOPTERS OVER THE PRISONER OF WAR CAMP.

THE ASSAULT FORCE LANDED INSIDE THE PRISON WALLS EXACTLY AS PLANNED AND THE REMAINDER OF THE RAIDING FORCE LANDED JUST OUTSIDE THE PRISON WALLS. THE EFFECT OF SURPRISE AND SHOCK ON THE ENEMY WAS OBVIOUSLY ACHIEVED. OUR INTENSE TRAINING HAD PAID OFF. WE WERE ORGANIZED, THE ENEMY WAS NOT. THE ASSAULT FORCE WENT DIRECTLY TO THE BUILDINGS WE SUSPECTED OF HOUSING OUR POWs. THE ENEMY DEFENDERS WHO INTERFERED WERE QUICKLY NEUTRALIZED. ALL OF THE CELLS AND BUILDINGS WERE QUICKLY AND THOROUGHLY SEARCHED. THERE WAS GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT WHEN THE CELLS WERE FOUND TO BE EMPTY - A DRY HOLE - A TREMENDOUS DISAPPOINTMENT TO ALL OF THE MEN WHO PLAYED A PART IN THIS HEROIC EFFORT. WE SUFFERED NO CASUALTIES.

THE EXTRACTION OF THE FORCE AND THE RETURN TO THE RECOVERY BASE WERE FOR THE MOST PART UNEVENTFUL ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SOME TENSE MOMENTS DUE TO THE SAM FIRINGS AT OUR AIRCRAFT. THIS ACTION FOR THE MOST PART WAS INEFFECTIVE AND WE RETALIATED BY FIRING AIR-TO-GROUND MISSILES AT THE ENEMY'S SAM GUIDANCE

RADARS THAT HAD LOCKED ON OUR AIRCRAFT.

UPON THEIR RETURN TO THE RECOVERY BASE I TALKED WITH THE MEN AND PRAISED THEM FOR THEIR EXTRAORDINARY AND VALOROUS EFFORTS. THERE WAS A UNIVERSAL FEELING OF DISAPPOINTMENT AND DISBELIEF. MANY OF THESE MEN EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO TRY AGAIN AND ASKED TO BE INCLUDED SHOULD ANOTHER ATTEMPT DEVELOP. THESE BRAVE MEN SYMBOLIZE OUR PROUD HERITAGE OF MEN WHO HAVE BEEN WILLING TO MAKE THE SUPREME SACRIFICE TO HELP THEIR FELLOW MAN AND TO SUPPORT AND DEFEND OUR CHERISHED FREEDOMS.

ONE COULD ASK THE QUESTION, WHY WOULD WE ATTEMPT SUCH AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS MISSION DEEP IN THE HEARTLAND OF THE ENEMY? WE MUST NEVER FORGET THAT THERE ARE SOME 1,550 AMERICANS EITHER PRISONERS OF WAR OR MISSING IN ACTION AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT WITH NORTH VIETNAM. WE MUST REMEMBER THAT IN JUST TWO SHORT MONTHS FROM NOW SOME OF OUR MEN WILL HAVE BEEN PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING FOR SEVEN LONG-SUFFERING YEARS. NEVER HAVE AMERICANS BEEN HELD FOR SUCH A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

NORTH VIETNAM HAS CONTINUALLY REFUSED TO HONOR HER GENEVA CONVENTION AGREEMENTS RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR. NORTH VIETNAM HAS REFUSED TO RELEASE THE SICK AND WOUNDED; REFUSED TO ALLOW FREE FLOW OF MAIL; REFUSED TO RELEASE OFFICIAL LISTS OF THOSE THEY HOLD PRISONER AND THOSE THEY KNOW TO BE DEAD; AND REFUSED TO ALLOW IMPARTIAL INSPECTIONS OF PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS.

IN SHARP CONTRAST ARE THE PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHERE THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HOLDS ABOUT 37,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG PRISONERS. THESE CAMPS ARE REGULARLY INSPECTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS. DEFICIENCIES ARE CORRECTED AND THE COMMITTEE MAY SPEAK WITH PRISONERS HELD BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRIVATELY OR IN GROUPS.

THE WORD TO DESCRIBE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IS "INHUMANE." "OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE," AS RECENTLY STATED BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LAIRD, "IS TO BRING THE PRISONERS BACK HOME AND REUNITE THEM WITH THEIR LOVED ONES." UNTIL THAT IS A REALITY, THE GOVERNMENT WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PRESSURE NORTH VIETNAM INTO OBSERVING THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION.



I WAS EXCEEDINGLY PROUD TO BE A PART OF THIS JOINT SERVICE EFFORT. IT WAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO AGAIN TAKE THE WAR TO THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE ENEMY'S CAPITAL AND GIVE THEM A TASTE OF THEIR OWN TACTICS. THIS WAS THE FIRST POSITIVE ACTION THAT HAS BEEN TAKEN TO ATTEMPT TO FREE OUR PRISONERS OF WAR. THIS MISSION REAFFIRMED TO THE WORLD OUR NATION'S CONCERN FOR OUR MEN HELD CAPTIVE BY THE ENEMY. IT GAVE RENEWED FAITH AND HOPE TO THE FAMILIES OF THE POWS AND THOSE MISSING IN ACTION AND HOPEFULLY, IT GAVE RENEWED FAITH AND HOPE TO THE POWS TOO. IT PROVED TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT THEY ARE NOT INVULNERABLE TO INCURSIONS DEEP IN THEIR TERRITORY WHEN WE FEEL A HUMANITARIAN NEED TO DO IT.

I WILL CLOSE BY EMPHASIZING THE JOINT SERVICE ASPECTS OF THE ENTIRE OPERATION. TO ME, IT WAS THE EPITOME OF COOPERATION AND WORKING IN CLOSE HARMONY BY ELEMENTS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE. THE PLANNING, TRAINING AND EXECUTION WERE ALMOST PERFECT IN EVERY RESPECT.

THE MISSION WAS CULMINATED IN A UNIQUE JOINT SERVICE CEREMONY, WITHOUT PRECEDENT, AT FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA, WHERE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PRESENTED DECORATIONS FOR VALOR TO THE MEMBERS OF THE FORCE.

GENTLEMEN AND YOUR LADIES -- I HAVE BEEN LOOKING FORWARD TO COMING DOWN TO HURLBURT SINCE I RECEIVED THE INVITATION FROM GENERAL KNIGHT/COLONEL POPE.

THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS -- FIRST, IT GIVES ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO

RUB ELBOWS WITH MY AIR FORCE COMPATRIOTS. AND SECONDLY, COMING BACK TO HURLBURT IS A VERY PLEASANT REUNION FOR ME. I DID ENJOY MY RECENT TOUR AT EGLIN AS COMMANDER OF THE SOF -- THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE. I HAD A FINE GROUP OF MEN TO WORK WITH, A GOOD BUNCH OF AIRPLANES TO FLY, AN EXCELLENT SET OF GOVERNMENT QUARTERS AND A BOAT. LET ME TELL YOU ABOUT THE BOAT -----!

BUT SERIOUSLY, THERE'S A THIRD REASON THAT I ENJOY COMING DOWN HERE TO THE HOME OF THE AIR COMMANDOS AND THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES. THAT REASON IS THAT I ALWAYS WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT THE SOF CONCEPT. I BECAME A FIRM BELIEVER IN THIS CONCEPT AND THIS MORNING I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT THE FUTURE OF SOF.

THERE ARE CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE SOF FUTURE THAT ARE FAIRLY PREDICTABLE. HERE I AM TALKING OF OUR ROLE IN GENERAL AND LIMITED WAR PLANNING. THERE IS NOW AND THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A REQUIREMENT FOR SOF FORCES ESPECIALLY IN SUPPORT OF THE UNCONVENTIONAL WAR MISSION - THAT UNIQUE COMBINATION OF THE RELATED ACTIVITIES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE, ESCAPE AND EVASION, SUBVERSION, DIRECT ACTION AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES. THESE SNEAKY-PETE MISSIONS WILL REMAIN. AND SO WILL THE REQUIREMENT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS. ALL TYPES OF COMBAT GENERATE REQUIREMENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND OUR SOF WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS. THESE UW AND PSYOP CONTRIBUTIONS WILL BE OF A CONTINUING NATURE.

AT THIS POINT YOU ARE PROBABLY ASKING YOURSELVES -- WELL WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF SOF IN COUNTERINSURGENCY, AFTER ALL THAT'S WHAT THE NAME OF THIS COURSE IS?

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ANY PROGNOSTICATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF OUR SPECIAL OPS, FORCE MUST BE DONE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE. PARTICULARLY THAT PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY THAT STATES AND I QUOTE "CONSISTENT WITH THE NIXON DOCTRINE. WE CAN AND WE WILL PROVIDE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUPPLEMENT LOCAL EFFORTS WHERE OUR INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED". UNQUOTE. YOU MIGHT ASK: "WHAT IS THE NIXON DOCTRINE?" ACTUALLY, THERE IS NO SINGLE PIECE OF PAPER BUT RATHER A SERIES OF FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENTS THAT DESCRIBE STRATEGY. THIS IS THE STRATEGY BY WHICH WE HOPE TO REALIZE OUR GOAL OF PEACE AS SUMMARIZED IN THE THREE PILLARS OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970s -- PARTNERSHIP, STRENGTH AND A WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE. THE COURSE WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS CHOSEN TO ATTAIN THIS GOAL IS THE COURSE OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS NOT THE PATH OF ISOLATIONISM--WHICH HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US, DOES NOT LEAD TO PEACE IN THE WORLD. NOR IS IT THE PATH OF THE PAX AMERICANA, WHICH WOULD IMPOSE ON OUR COUNTRY THE BURDEN OF BEARING THE PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFEGUARDING THE PEACE OF THE WORLD AGAINST ALL POSSIBLE THREATS. THE PRESIDENT'S COURSE CAREFULLY MAINTAINS A LEVEL OF MILITARY STRENGTH ADEQUATE TO MEET THE THREATS TO OUR SECURITY, AVOIDING TRUCULENCE, PROVOCATION, OR DOMINATION ON THE ONE HAND AND, AVOIDING, ON THE OTHER, THE WEAKNESS THAT INVITES AGGRESSION.

THERE HAVE BEEN SOME RECENT ACTIONS TOWARD IMPLEMENTING THE NIXON DOCTRINE. ONE OF THE FIRST STEPS HAS BEEN THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM AND THE ATTENDANT US FORCE REDUCTIONS. KOREA TOO, AS WELL AS OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD ARE SEEING US FORCE REDUCTIONS UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE.

ANOTHER ACTION IS THE REVISED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT ACT SENT TO CONGRESS. IT APPEARS THAT THESE NEW ACTS WILL NOT BE ACTED ON BY CONGRESS THIS YEAR ~~BECAUSE OF HEAVY POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IN AN ELECTION~~ YEAR.

THE MILITARY SERVICES FOR THEIR PART ARE CURRENTLY REEVALUATING THEIR FORCE STRUCTURE, TACTICS AND DOCTRINE IN ORDER TO MORE EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT THE NIXON DOCTRINE. WE ON THE JOINT STAFF ARE CONSTANTLY SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY TOWARD ASSISTING THE PRESIDENT IN THE ATTAINMENT OF HIS FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.

WE SHOULD EACH STUDY THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND STUDY ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AIR FORCE. INCIDENTALLY, I MIGHT ADD HERE THAT IT LOOKS LIKE THE NIXON DOCTRINE WOULD NOT BE OUT OF VOGUE WITH AN ADMINISTRATION CHANGE, IN VIEW OF CONTINUING PRESSURES OF AUSTERE FUNDING, INCREASED INTEREST IN DOMESTIC CONCERNS, ETC. I BELIEVE THOUGH THAT THE TONE OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE IS QUITE CLEAR -- LESS INVOLVEMENT OF US FORCES IN INSURGENCIES AND OTHER CONTINGENCIES. YET IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WILL BE NO US INVOLVEMENT IN THESE ACTIVITIES. CERTAINLY WE MUST MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO EXERCISE MILITARY OPTIONS FOR THOSE POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES WHERE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED.

THERE ARE SOME WHO VIEW THE NIXON DOCTRINE AS SUGGESTING THERE WILL BE NO FUTURE INVOLVEMENT OF US FORCES IN ASSISTING LESSER-DEVELOPED NATIONS. I CANNOT ACCEPT THAT INTERPRETATION. MR. NIXON WAS QUITE CLEAR WHEN HE SAID THE US WOULD PROVIDE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THREATENED NATIONS. HE DID NOTE, THOUGH, THAT THE HOST NATION WOULD PROVIDE THE "MANPOWER."

SO WE CAN ANTICIPATE US PARTICIPATION, THEN, WHERE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE AFFECTED BY COMMUNIST INSURGENT ACTION AGAINST A FRIENDLY NATION REQUESTING OUR ASSISTANCE. BUT WHAT DO WE ENVISION AS THE TYPE OF US INVOLVEMENT? CERTAINLY, THERE WILL BE A CONTINUATION OF THE MOBILE TRAINING TEAM (MTT) CONCEPT WHICH I'M CONFIDENT YOU DISCUSSED IN THE CLASSROOM HERE. THESE TEAMS OFFER A UNIQUE CAPABILITY TO PASS ALONG ADVICE, ASSISTANCE, TRAINING AND TO ENHANCE THE RAPPORT BETWEEN FRIENDLY AIR FORCES. AND THEY CAN BE USED FOR MANY TYPES OF

TRAINING -- E.G., TEACHING GUNSHIP EMPLOYMENT TO THE THAIS OR ESTABLISHING A SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL FOR THE VNAF. OUR RECORDED SUCCESSES OVER NEARLY A DECADE OF SOF-ORIENTED MTTs HAS PROVIDED AN INVALUABLE EXPERIENCE BASE UPON WHICH TO BUILD AND EXPAND OUR FUTURE ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. PARTICULARLY ON A JOINT BASIS, THE ARMY ESPECIALLY AND THE NAVY, TOO, FIELD A WIDE VARIETY OF MTTs. SOME OF THESE COULD AND SHOULD BE JOINT EFFORTS AND WE MAY SEE MORE OF THESE IN THE FUTURE. THE MTT CONCEPT WILL CONTINUE AS A VIABLE PROGRAM.

WE MAY ALSO SEE AN ENHANCED ZI TRAINING PROGRAM FOR OUR ALLIED AIR FORCES. DUE TO AUSTERE FUNDING AND THE DESIRE FOR A LOW-VISIBILITY, LOW-PROFILE US PRESENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES, IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT MORE OF THE TRAINING WILL SHIFT TO THE UNITED STATES.

THERE IS AN INTERESTING ASPECT OF THE TRAINING MISSION THAT SOMETIMES GOES UNNOTICED. YOU CAN TRAIN AN INDIGENOUS SOLDIER, AN INFANTRY-MAN, IN A MATTER OF MONTHS. AND WITH A FEW MONTHS TRAINING, HE'LL PERFORM FAIRLY WELL IN COMBAT. BUT THIS IS NOT TRUE OF THE AIR TEAM. IT TAKES OVER A YEAR AND IN SOME CASES NEARLY TWO YEARS TO TURN OUT A COMPETENT COMBAT-READY PILOT OR CREW. THE SOPHISTICATION -- EVEN OF UNSOPHISTICATED AIRPLANES -- OF AVIONICS, HYDRAULICS, ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, ETC., ALSO REQUIRES CONSIDERABLE TIME. THIS TIME IS NEEDED TO INSURE THAT MAINTENANCE CREWS ARE COMPETENT AND CAPABLE OF KEEPING THEIR BIRDS FLYING. WHAT I'M SUGGESTING HERE IS THAT OUR EFFORTS WITH MTTs AND OTHER ASSOCIATED TRAINING IS A VERY VITAL ASPECT OF OUR S.O.F. MISSION. AND OUR AIR-ORIENTED TRAINING PROGRAMS ARE MUCH MORE DEMANDING THAN THOSE OF OUR SISTER SERVICE COUNTERPARTS. CONSEQUENTLY, YOUR JOBS ARE THAT MUCH MORE CHALLENGING.

ANOTHER EXTREMELY VITAL AREA AND ONE WE'VE HAD CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS WITH IS CIVIC ACTION. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS -- PROPERLY PLANNED AND EXECUTED AND EMPHASIZING THE ROLE OF THE INDIGENOUS FORCES -- HAVE PROVIDED MANY PEOPLE WITH IMPROVED CONDITIONS. BUT, AGAIN, I SUSPECT THIS HAS BEEN TAUGHT HERE IN DETAIL, SO I WON'T REPLAY OLD GROUND. I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE

THOUGH, THAT WE ARE REALIZING THE ADVANTAGES OF CIVIC ACTION "TYPE" PROJECTS IN OUR OWN COUNTRY. THE DOMESTIC ACTION PROGRAMS WHICH WE ARE PRESENTLY PURSUING ARE BEGINNING TO REAP BENEFITS. YOUTH OPPORTUNITY SUMMER RECREATION PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN QUITE SUCCESSFUL AT MANY AIR FORCE BASES. THESE PROGRAMS PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR UNDERPRIVILEGED YOUTH TO ENJOY THE RECREATION, EDUCATION, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, ETC., THAT IS ALL A PART OF "SUMMER CAMP." ALSO MANY BASES HAVE BECOME INVOLVED WITH COMMUNITY "POVERTY POCKETS" AND HAVE ASSISTED THE RESIDENTS WITH ORGANIZED CLEAN-UP PROJECTS. THIS "GET INVOLVED" ATTITUDE OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IS SHOWING IMMEASURABLE RETURNS WITH THE POOR, THE LESS-EDUCATED AND WITH MINORITY GROUPS. AND WITH OTHER SEGMENTS OF OUR SOCIETY, TOO. LAST WINTER, YOU MAY RECALL, AIR FORCE UNITS DROPPED MANY TONS OF FEED TO BLIZZARD-MAROONED CATTLE OUT WEST. JUST LAST MONTH OUR C-123s WERE ON INSECT CONTROL SPRAY MISSIONS IN SOUTHERN LOUISIANA HELPING TO ERADICATE VEE, THE VENEZUELAN ENCEPHALITIS FEVER THAT HAS BEEN FATAL TO SO MANY HORSES.

THE ARMY, TOO, HAS HAD A GREAT DEAL OF SUCCESS IN THESE DOMESTIC CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS. AT FT. BRAGG, THE SPECIAL FORCES UNITS, THE GREEN BERETS, THAT IS, HAVE BEEN TRAINING THEIR TROOPS IN CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS BY ASSISTING THE PEOPLES OF TWO NEARBY COUNTIES THERE IN NORTH CAROLINA. THESE AREAS HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED AS ECONOMICALLY DEPRESSED AND THE SPECIAL FORCES PEOPLE HAVE AIDED MANY OF THE LOCAL RESIDENTS BY HELPING OUT WITH MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND YOUTH ACTIVITY PROGRAMS AS WELL AS NUMEROUS OTHER ENDEAVORS.

THESE ALL SHOW OUR POPULATION -- ESPECIALLY THE ANTI-MILITARISTS -- THAT WE MAY EVEN BE A BIT HUMAN, THAT WE MAY REALLY CARE ABOUT THINGS OTHER THAN WAR AND DESTRUCTION; AND I'M CONFIDENT IT WILL NOT ONLY HELP OUR IMAGE, BUT ALSO -- AND MORE IMPORTANTLY -- IT WILL AID IN THE CURE OF SOME OF OUR DOMESTIC ILLS. WHAT IS IT REALLY? CIVIC ACTION AT HOME. I WOULD ENCOURAGE THOSE OF YOU ON YOUR WAY OVERSEAS TO SPEND SOME OF YOUR TIME AND ENERGY IN CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS AND THEN WHEN YOU RETURN TO THE STATES, TRANSFER THAT KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE, AND HELP WITH OUR DOMESTIC ACTION PROGRAMS AT THE BASE/COMMUNITY LEVEL.

THIS "GET INVOLVED" APPROACH IS NOT THE STRICT DOMAIN OF THE MEN.

LADIES --- SO FAR I HAVE ADDRESSED MOST OF MY REMARKS TO THE MEN -- BUT NOW I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO YOU FOR A MINUTE. I KNOW THAT YOU LADIES HERE TODAY HAVE A FINE APPRECIATION FOR CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES. MOST OF YOU ALREADY HAVE OR WILL IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BECOME INVOLVED IN LOCAL CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS SUCH AS, CHURCH ACTIVITIES, HOSPITAL AID WORK, AND SCHOOL AFFAIRS. HERE IN THE US, THIS PARTICIPATION OF THE MILITARY FAMILIES IS IMPORTANT AND IT IS EVEN MORE SO WHEN YOU ARE IN FOREIGN LANDS. ANYTHING THAT YOU CAN DO TO THAT LEADS TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY FOR THESE PEOPLE IS ANOTHER EXTENSION OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE; SO THOSE OF YOU THAT ARE GOING OVERSEAS WITH YOUR HUSBANDS, I URGE YOU TO CONTINUE YOUR EXCELLENT WORK. AND THOSE OF YOU THAT STAY HERE IN THE US, PARTICULARLY WHILE YOUR HUSBANDS ARE AWAY, I WOULD ADD THAT THIS COUNTRY OF OURS AND THE AIR FORCE NEEDS ALL THE HELP IT CAN GET, SO YOUR HELP IS NEEDED AND APPRECIATED.

GETTING BACK TO THE FUTURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES YOU HAVE PROBABLY ASKED:

HOW ABOUT ACTUAL COMBAT INVOLVEMENT OF US FORCES IN FUTURE CONTINGENCIES? WE CAN READILY SEE THE NEED TO EMPLOY THOSE FORCES WHICH ARE EASILY ENGAGED AND EASILY DISENGAGED -- I.E., THOSE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE AND MILITARILY EFFECTIVE FORCES. OF COURSE, AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE IS THE CASE OF AIR SUPPORT IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS DURING RECENT MONTHS. AIR IS MORE IMPERSONAL -- EASIER TO INITIATE AND EASIER TO TERMINATE -- HENCE WE SEE A GREATER ROLE FOR THE USAF IN THIS AREA. NOT ONLY IS AIR SUPPORT EFFECTIVE, BUT IT ALSO RUNS FEWER RISKS TO AMERICAN LIVES. SECRETARY LAIRD NOTED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

AIRPOWER AND ITS ABILITY TO FUNCTION WITHOUT HEAVY US CASUALTIES IN AN AUGUST NEWS INTERVIEW WHEN HE SAID ABOUT OUR SOUTHEAST ASIAN OPERATIONS "...THE REASON WE ARE USING AIR POWER TO STOP THE BUILDUP OF SUPPLIES AND MANPOWER IN THAT AREA IS TO MINIMIZE AMERICAN CASUALTIES, BECAUSE THE CASUALTIES THAT ARE INFLICTED BY THE USE OF AIRPOWER AS FAR AS AMERICANS ARE CONCERNED ARE ALMOST ZERO..."

WE FORESEE CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES AND SITUATIONS WHERE AIR POWER MAY BE THE ONLY US COMBAT FORCE INVOLVED. THEREFORE, WE RECOGNIZE A NEED FOR AN ENHANCED INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITY--AND SPECIFICALLY, ONE THAT DOES NOT RELY ON GROUND SOURCES. THIS NATURALLY LEADS TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN ENHANCED AIRBORNE SENSOR CAPABILITY--ONE THAT WILL PROVIDE ACCURATE, DEPENDABLE, REAL-TIME TARGET INPUTS. WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO ENTERTAIN ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THIS ASPECT OF OUR OPERATIONS. CONVERSELY, WE RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY FOR JOINT OPERATIONS. MY OWN EXPERIENCE WITH THE SON TAY POW RAID HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR FULLY INTEGRATED, JOINT OPERATIONS. I CAN TELL YOU THAT IN OUR EFFORTS TO FREE THE POWS EACH OF THE SERVICES WORKED WHOLEHEARTEDLY AND VERY EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER. IT WAS TRULY A TEAM EFFORT.

LET ME MOVE NOW TO A FEW COMMENTS ABOUT THE "PEOPLE" - PEOPLE LIKE YOURSELVES WHO WILL BE INVOLVED WITH THESE TRAINING, CIVIC ACTION AND ACTUAL EMPLOYMENT MISSIONS.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE WOULD INDICATE THAT AIR POWER WILL PLAY THE DOMINANT ROLE IN FUTURE CONTINGENCIES. BUT I WOULD GO FURTHER AND SAY THAT THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL WILL BE PARAMOUNT. THAT IS, THE ROLE OF THE "TOTAL" PERSON--THE "TOTAL" OFFICER OR AIRMAN WORKING WITH US AGENCIES, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, WORKING WITH OUR ALLIES AND HOST AIR FORCES AROUND THE WORLD.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT YOUR STUDIES HERE AND YOUR SELECTION FOR YOUR ASSIGNMENTS PLACE YOU IN A UNIQUE POSITION OF UNDERSTANDING THIS "HUMAN" ASPECT, AND THEREBY PROVIDES YOU THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE--WHEREVER YOU MAY SERVE.



I'VE ALREADY NOTED THE AUSTERE FUNDING WE FACE IN THE FUTURE. THIS WILL PLACE EVEN GREATER CHALLENGES ON THE INDIVIDUAL--DEMANDING GREATER KNOWLEDGE, GREATER INITIATIVE, GREATER SACRIFICE--WHILE PROVIDING BETTER ASSISTANCE TO OUR ALLIES, YET DOING IT WITH LESSER MATERIAL RESOURCES.

THE CHALLENGE OF AUSTERITY BECOMES AN EVEN GREATER CHALLENGE WHEN WE RECOGNIZE THAT MUCH OF OUR ROLE IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS IS RELATED DIRECTLY TO ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. AND IN THESE CASES, WE WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR ALLIED FRIENDS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS--NATIONS WHOSE DEFENSE BUDGETS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED AND HENCE--AUSTERITY TO THE NTH POWER. WHILE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE FIND A WAY TO UPDATE THE "FLINTSTONE FLEETS" OF THE AIR FORCES IN THE DEVELOPING NATIONS--WE HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THESE LIMITED BUDGETS.

LET ME NOTE ANOTHER "PERSONNEL" OR "PEOPLE-ORIENTED" CONCERN--THAT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OR "PSYOPS." WE ARE AGREED THAT POPULAR SUPPORT IS A REQUISITE FOR SUCCESS IN COIN. AND THIS POPULAR SUPPORT CAN BE ENHANCED CONSIDERABLY BY PSYOPS ACTIVITIES.

TRADITIONALLY THE AIR FORCE HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED AS THE PSYOPS MESSAGE "DELIVERY BOYS." EITHER WE DROP LEAFLETS OR WE EMPLOY AIRBORNE LOUDSPEAKERS TO BROADCAST TAPED MESSAGES. PERSONALLY, I FEEL THIS IS A VERY NARROW VIEW OF OUR TOTAL PSYOPS CAPABILITY.

THERE IS A PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT INHERENT IN AIRPOWER ITSELF. ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION, THE CAPTURED VC OR NVA SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM HAVE EXPRESSED A FEAR OF AIRPOWER. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, AIRPOWER EMPLOYED IN HUMANITARIAN ROL E.G., HELICOPTER RESCUE OF FLOOD VICTIMS; AERIAL RESUPPLY OF VICTIMS OF EARTHQUAKES, TORNADOES, ETC; OR AIR EVACUATION OF CRITICALLY ILL TO DISTANT MEDICAL FACILITIES, ALL TEND TO INFLUENCE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS. GREATER ATTENTION MUST BE GIVEN TO ASSISTING FLEDGLING AIR FORCES TO EXPLOIT THESE INHERENT CAPABILITIES.

FURTHER, WE NEED TO GET A BETTER HANDLE ON ANALYZING AND ACTUALLY REACHING TARGET AUDIENCES IN THE PSYOPS FIELD. WE NEED BETTER TRAINED PSYOPS PERSONNEL WHO ARE WELL-EDUCATED IN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND CROSS-CULTURAL RELATIONSHIPS. WE CAN THEN INFLUENCE WHAT THE MESSAGES SHALL CONSIST OF-- RATHER THAN JUST DELIVERING THEM. AGAIN THIS MISSION CAPABILITY WILL PROBABLY NEED TO BE EXPANDED IN THOSE CONTINGENCIES I NOTED BEFORE--THOSE WHERE AIR POWER IS THE PRIME, IF NOT ONLY, FORCE EMPLOYED.

ANOTHER "PERSONNEL" AREA THAT MAY SEE SOME CHANGE IN THE FUTURE IS THE AREA OF AIRCREWS. WHILE WE STARTED IN THE EARLY 60s WITH THE "JUNGLE JIM" OR AIR COMMANDO CONCEPT, WE HAVE TENDED TO MOVE AWAY FROM THIS IN RECENT YEARS. HOWEVER, WITH PROGRAMMED FORCE REDUCTIONS, DECREASED BUDGETS AND SIMILAR OR ENLARGED MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES, I SEE A TREND BACK TOWARD THE JUNGLE JIM "TYPE" AIRCREWMAN, I.E., A HIGHLY QUALIFIED VOLUNTEER, WHO WILL BE MULTI-CAPABLE AND ABLE TO IDENTIFY WITH AND OPERATE IN THE AUSTERE ENVIRONMENT WITH WHICH HE WILL BE FACED. I ENVISION NO GREATER DIFFICULTY IN OUR RETURN TO THE HIGHLY MOTIVATED CADRE FORCE, SINCE WE WILL PROBABLY HAVE FEWER FORCES, WE CAN BE MORE JUDICIOUS AND EXERCISE GREATER SELECTIVITY IN DETERMINING WHO MAKES THE TEAM. THESE--THEN--ARE A FEW CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPS IN THE FUTURE. WE WILL BE OPERATING WITH REDUCED BUDGETS, BUT VERY LIKELY BE INCURRING EVEN GREATER MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES. IT IS ONLY THROUGH THE HARD WORK, THE INGENUITY AND THE DEDICATION OF SUCH PEOPLE AS YOURSELVES THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH OUR TASKS. YOURS IS A CONSIDERABLE CHALLENGE. YET I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU--LIKE THE MANY US MILITARY MEN BEFORE YOU-- WILL MEET THE CHALLENGE.

I SALUTE YOU AND WISH YOU GOD SPEED IN YOUR FUTURE ENDEAVORS. GOOD LUCK TO EACH OF YOU.